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JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

A Joint Committee on Intelligence for legislative oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence community gives rise to considerations which are peculiar to an intelligence organization like the Central Intelligence.

Security In the collection of intelligence and in the correlation and dissemination of intelligence information to our Government, differing security considerations are necessary not only for the protection of its own activities, sources, and methods, but also to retain the convidence of friendly foreign governments from which it gets invaluable sensitive material. National or foreign intelligence information is collected not only from its own sources, but also from each of the other intelligence components of Government, such as, Department of State, INR; Department of Justice, FBI; Atomic Energy Commission; National Security Agency; and the Department of Defense, DIA. In consequence, security must be maintained for the Agency for its entire organization in such basic matters as personnel, budget, organization, and expenditures.

The Intelligence Product The end product of the intelligence

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community, furnishing intelligence, is provided by the Director of Central Intelligence to the President and policy makers in the Executive Branch. Within the Executive Branch, this is viewed as the exclusive property of the President in view of his constitutional responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs. Intelligence being only one factor in policy decisions, giving it to Congress without discrimination, could give rise to serious political difficulties between the Executive and Legislative Branchs and create a devided allegiance for those intelligence agencies affected, thereby.

Committee Jurisdiction Most agencies of Government deal with the Congress from the standpoint of exclusive range of responsibility. But CIA has the focal point of an intelligence community comprising other components of other agencies that have their own direct responsibility to the Congress and are assigned to other committees. This is a formidable jurisdictional problem that has existed from the beginning.

Covert Operations In addition to its intelligence mission, the Agency is charged with the conduct of certain other activities directed by the Executive. These operations are governed by policy directives from elements of the Executive Branch and are subject to review in that branch. A review of these would cover policy decisions of the

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Executive for which the Agency does not have responsibility. Under the present committee system, the security of the subcommittees has been excellent even though it cannot be assumed that a Joint Committee would be less secure particularly where under some proposals, such as by that one by Senator Mansfield, the members of the Joint Committee would be that of the CIA Subcommitteess. Looking to the intelligence product, although the present Subcommittees have not raised the issue ~~under~~ over the production of furnished intelligence on command, they could do so at any time. It would appear a Joint Committee would be most likely to do so, but the issue, the President's responsibility for foreign affairs, is the same under either system. A Joint Committee, in fact, might confine the problem by continuing to preclude requests from other committees such as could be made under the present system. Still on the same issue of conduct of foreign affairs, there would ~~be~~ seem to be little difference between the present Subcommittees and the Joint Committee with regard to the conduct of other activities by the CIA under Executive direction. Since the control of these operations, however, has been one of the main motives for a Joint Congressional Committee, such Committee would tend to bring the issue into focus.

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The success in maintaining security and other considerations that has been enjoyed by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is cited to favor such a committee under continuation of the present Subcommittee system. That Agency, however, deals to a large extent with activities solely within the United States with great economic expenditures which have a singular effect on American industry. The Agency, however, and the intelligence community are dealing with national intelligence activities that exist solely outside the United States.

One other consideration that has been noted, that in pressing for a Joint Committee, many members are pressing not only against the established procedures of certain Chairman but are also finding it might be believed at a lack of agreement in what the Administration is doing in foreign affairs and Agency participation therein.

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